Overmuser claims to have a simple proof that classical hedonic utilitarianism is false, because of a fundamental asymmetry between pleasure and suffering: you can always choose to forgo pleasure, but you cannot choose to endure sufficiently powerful suffering.
Thank you for this thoughtful article! I would like to make a quick reply, after a first read. Some of the points below may evolve as I think more in-depth about what you wrote.
First, I want to reiterate that I am not a Negative Utilitarian, as I've said elsewhere. My argument is that NU is better than CU to serve as the *basis* of morality, not that it is all there is to morality. For instance, I accept tradeoffs between pains and pleasures, and I even accept that people can pursue pain, like in the case of masochists (which NUs think is immoral). I am currently writing several articles following this line of thought.
Yes, pain asymbolia is a problem, as I said in the article, but not only for NU. It's a problem for all forms of hedonism. Preference Utilitarianism has its own shortcomings, which I will address at a later point. One of them is probably just that it says basically nothing about what we should do. Here is an example: a person is suffering from a deep depression, unable to move out of their bed, or even want to move from their bed, unable to do anything at all. A doctor has the cure. However, since this person has no preferences (in fact this is one of the defining features of depression as a disease, albeit the example I'm currently writing is taken to the extreme), the doctor is under no obligation to give them the cure. Because this person has no preferences, Preference Utilitarianism is completely silent as to whether we should help them, or even as to whether the word "help" has any meaning in this case. You could reply that some forms of hedonism are also silent. I will think about this.
As you noted, I left the concept of "suffering" underspecified in the article, because I wanted to be as broad and consensual as possible. Because of this underspecification, some forms of extreme pain do not qualify as "suffering" under the definition that I used. My working assumption is that, for every mind, there is an experience that is so bad that it will break them. This experience doesn't have to be the same for everyone. Under this assumption, even the people you presented in your article would break if confronted with that tailor-made experience. Some people have an incredibly high tolerance for pain, but would break if their emotional traumas were reopened, for example. Specifying "suffering" as being "this exact set of bad experiences" would be self-defeating.
Regarding the "exponential sufferer" having an obligation to help the "superexponential sufferer", I think you misunderstood the argument that I was trying to make. Because the exponential sufferer has already had their will suppressed by the extreme suffering, they *cannot* desire anything but its alleviation. No moral agency. Asking whether they have a moral obligation to alleviate the "superexponential sufferer" is simply invalid. I find your objections about some pleasures becoming all-consuming stronger and more interesting that this one. It could also be the case that some pleasures are so intense that you cannot resist them, even if pursuing them hurts your future self or others. In this case, you would have a "positive abolition" of moral agency.
It is possible that both nociception and beneception require desire to qualify as "pain" and "pleasure". In this case, a hybrid theory between Hedonism (positive or negative) and Preference Utilitarianism, would be required.
I will stop here, because replying to your other objections requires more in-depth thinking, and a review of the scientific literature.
Again, thanks a lot for your reply, it is well-sourced, well-written (if a little harsh) and some of your points actually raise interesting questions.
It certainly is harsh, and I appreciate your graciousness! I am harsh here primarily because of two details:
1. The abuse of "ought implies can." If, as you say, it is literally impossible to choose otherwise, then no normative theory will recommend any alternative. So this cannot asymmetrically count against hedonic utilitarianism but not affect other theories.
2. The claim that this is a "proof", when the proof relies entirely on the inference from ought implies can.
Unfortunately, I don't think your reply really addresses either of these concerns.
I don't think anyone on Substack gives you credit for how much of a consistently good sport you are in discussions even in light of poignancy. Definitely a level I want to reach!
What if “impossible to ignore” simply means that the suffering – or perhaps the pain – is such that we die from it?
We can die from too much pain. Easily. But can we die from too much pleasure? Has that been tried?
And even if it is true that we can die from too much pleasure (hypothetically, though the reverse is routinely the case somewhere right now), is the asymmetry apparent in the fact that we (yes, we; all of us) would prefer that death to the death from pain just a harmless quirk of statistics without normative implications?
Is it actually true "We can die from too much pain"? like in real life we can "die from pain" due to it's physiological effects like cardiovascular strain. Put if we are in a philosophical mode talking about "pain itself" (seems like the relevant thing to a utilitarian theory?), I'm not sure we can (i.e a brain in a vat probably could not die from pain).
When brains in vats become possible, I will worry and theorize about the ethics of a world in which they are possible. Until then, I want – and I am only justified – to worry and theorize about the ethics of our actual world. Worrying and theorizing about the only thing we could change is what is worth worrying and theorizing about.
I mean I think when we are talking about utilitarian theories, we are talking about the intrinsic badness of pain, and not it's instrumental badness right? So untangling those seems relevant.
Yes, but the question about possible worlds and the actual world bears no relation to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental badness. It may be the intrinsic badness of pain in the actual world that negative utilitarianism worries about. It may also be the instrumental badness of pain as a means to something intrinsically bad – again, in the actual world – that negative utilitarianism of a likewise morally realist variety could worry about.
There are people right now who are in agonising pain, and are being kept alive artificially in hospitals, either because the law doesn't allow the doctors to pull the plug on life support, or because the family is opposed to it. One of the most bizarre testimonies I've ever heard was that of a woman whose mom was dying, but the doctors were only allowed to stop feeding her and giving her water, not actively help her pass away. So they gave her painkillers and put humid towels on her mouth to diminish the feeling of thirst (this is what I understood from what she said), until she died of dehydration and malnutrition. In such cases, the person is not dying from the pain, but is it truly moral to do that to them?
Ah, so this shows that pain is not really what’s at the bottom, doesn’t it? Rather, pain is evidence for the intrinsically disvaluable entity underneath it all. The best natural selection could do is equip us with that instrument.
Thank you for this thoughtful article! I would like to make a quick reply, after a first read. Some of the points below may evolve as I think more in-depth about what you wrote.
First, I want to reiterate that I am not a Negative Utilitarian, as I've said elsewhere. My argument is that NU is better than CU to serve as the *basis* of morality, not that it is all there is to morality. For instance, I accept tradeoffs between pains and pleasures, and I even accept that people can pursue pain, like in the case of masochists (which NUs think is immoral). I am currently writing several articles following this line of thought.
Yes, pain asymbolia is a problem, as I said in the article, but not only for NU. It's a problem for all forms of hedonism. Preference Utilitarianism has its own shortcomings, which I will address at a later point. One of them is probably just that it says basically nothing about what we should do. Here is an example: a person is suffering from a deep depression, unable to move out of their bed, or even want to move from their bed, unable to do anything at all. A doctor has the cure. However, since this person has no preferences (in fact this is one of the defining features of depression as a disease, albeit the example I'm currently writing is taken to the extreme), the doctor is under no obligation to give them the cure. Because this person has no preferences, Preference Utilitarianism is completely silent as to whether we should help them, or even as to whether the word "help" has any meaning in this case. You could reply that some forms of hedonism are also silent. I will think about this.
As you noted, I left the concept of "suffering" underspecified in the article, because I wanted to be as broad and consensual as possible. Because of this underspecification, some forms of extreme pain do not qualify as "suffering" under the definition that I used. My working assumption is that, for every mind, there is an experience that is so bad that it will break them. This experience doesn't have to be the same for everyone. Under this assumption, even the people you presented in your article would break if confronted with that tailor-made experience. Some people have an incredibly high tolerance for pain, but would break if their emotional traumas were reopened, for example. Specifying "suffering" as being "this exact set of bad experiences" would be self-defeating.
Regarding the "exponential sufferer" having an obligation to help the "superexponential sufferer", I think you misunderstood the argument that I was trying to make. Because the exponential sufferer has already had their will suppressed by the extreme suffering, they *cannot* desire anything but its alleviation. No moral agency. Asking whether they have a moral obligation to alleviate the "superexponential sufferer" is simply invalid. I find your objections about some pleasures becoming all-consuming stronger and more interesting that this one. It could also be the case that some pleasures are so intense that you cannot resist them, even if pursuing them hurts your future self or others. In this case, you would have a "positive abolition" of moral agency.
It is possible that both nociception and beneception require desire to qualify as "pain" and "pleasure". In this case, a hybrid theory between Hedonism (positive or negative) and Preference Utilitarianism, would be required.
I will stop here, because replying to your other objections requires more in-depth thinking, and a review of the scientific literature.
Again, thanks a lot for your reply, it is well-sourced, well-written (if a little harsh) and some of your points actually raise interesting questions.
It certainly is harsh, and I appreciate your graciousness! I am harsh here primarily because of two details:
1. The abuse of "ought implies can." If, as you say, it is literally impossible to choose otherwise, then no normative theory will recommend any alternative. So this cannot asymmetrically count against hedonic utilitarianism but not affect other theories.
2. The claim that this is a "proof", when the proof relies entirely on the inference from ought implies can.
Unfortunately, I don't think your reply really addresses either of these concerns.
I don't think anyone on Substack gives you credit for how much of a consistently good sport you are in discussions even in light of poignancy. Definitely a level I want to reach!
What if “impossible to ignore” simply means that the suffering – or perhaps the pain – is such that we die from it?
We can die from too much pain. Easily. But can we die from too much pleasure? Has that been tried?
And even if it is true that we can die from too much pleasure (hypothetically, though the reverse is routinely the case somewhere right now), is the asymmetry apparent in the fact that we (yes, we; all of us) would prefer that death to the death from pain just a harmless quirk of statistics without normative implications?
Is it actually true "We can die from too much pain"? like in real life we can "die from pain" due to it's physiological effects like cardiovascular strain. Put if we are in a philosophical mode talking about "pain itself" (seems like the relevant thing to a utilitarian theory?), I'm not sure we can (i.e a brain in a vat probably could not die from pain).
When brains in vats become possible, I will worry and theorize about the ethics of a world in which they are possible. Until then, I want – and I am only justified – to worry and theorize about the ethics of our actual world. Worrying and theorizing about the only thing we could change is what is worth worrying and theorizing about.
I mean I think when we are talking about utilitarian theories, we are talking about the intrinsic badness of pain, and not it's instrumental badness right? So untangling those seems relevant.
Yes, but the question about possible worlds and the actual world bears no relation to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental badness. It may be the intrinsic badness of pain in the actual world that negative utilitarianism worries about. It may also be the instrumental badness of pain as a means to something intrinsically bad – again, in the actual world – that negative utilitarianism of a likewise morally realist variety could worry about.
There are people right now who are in agonising pain, and are being kept alive artificially in hospitals, either because the law doesn't allow the doctors to pull the plug on life support, or because the family is opposed to it. One of the most bizarre testimonies I've ever heard was that of a woman whose mom was dying, but the doctors were only allowed to stop feeding her and giving her water, not actively help her pass away. So they gave her painkillers and put humid towels on her mouth to diminish the feeling of thirst (this is what I understood from what she said), until she died of dehydration and malnutrition. In such cases, the person is not dying from the pain, but is it truly moral to do that to them?
Ah, so this shows that pain is not really what’s at the bottom, doesn’t it? Rather, pain is evidence for the intrinsically disvaluable entity underneath it all. The best natural selection could do is equip us with that instrument.