This is a slightly messier, more thought-dump essay than I’d normally write, but I haven’t published in a while and I felt like I needed to get something out there.
Okay, now I’m completely confused because aren’t philosophical zombies, supposed to be micro physically identical to us. In what sense can they be micro physically identical if they are not even operating under the same laws of Physics?
Also, even taking this thought experiment on its own terms, isn’t this just another way of asking whether consciousness is identical to something physical? If you think that a heartbeat is the same thing as the physical movement of heart muscles then it’s internally contradictory to imagine somebody who is micro physically identical to you, but doesn’t have a heartbeat. Meanwhile, if you think that a heartbeat isn’t just something physical, it is not contradictory to imagine such a person, so this just seems to be a different way of asking the same question that doesn’t actually bring new light to the issue. Basically, you can’t answer the question of whether a philosophical zombie is self-contradictory without already answering the question of whether consciousness is something physical. In which case there is no point to imagining a philosophical zombie.
I talk about physical possibility because I think that's easier to grasp. Chalmers is talking about metaphysical possibility: he is assuming even the laws of physics *which dictate particle motion and how physical things affect other physical things* are the same, and asking if consciousness can still be modulated.
To your second point: this *is* the same as asking whether consciousness is identical to something physical. But I don't think this makes it pointless: it is meant as a test and intuition pump to *determine* whether consciousness is identical to something physical. It might be easier to think about whether rotating a shape could change its volume rather than whether commutativity of multiplication follows from the Peano axioms. These are deep down the "same question", but one is an easier thinking tool.
Got it about your first point. Regarding your second point, if I am understanding you correctly, you are basically arguing that the idea of a philosophical zombie is still a useful intuition pump. I admit I’m not sure how this works for people who don’t believe in physicalism. However, when I try to imagine this, since when I speak of consciousness, I speak of something which is one of the but for causes of me talking about consciousness. So if you hold the laws of logic and Physics constantremoving consciousness will obviously result in the physical change of me no longer talking about consciousness. Meanwhile, if I believed in eppiphenomenalism I would accordingly imagine that removing consciousness would not have any other effects. Sweet appears that you can’t actually answer the question of whether a philosophical zombie is possible without implicitly, asking the question regarding the nature of consciousness the old-fashioned way without an intuition pump.
Is there something I’m missing? I admit this is not the only consciousness related thought experiment where I have this same problem. Lots of seemingly smart people act like Mary’s room is a brilliant intuition pump, but to me it appear obvious that you can’t actually get anything out of that thought experiment without having to answer the question the old fashion way. My own sense is that people are letting their imagination in the absence of relevant evidence, lead them a stray into thinking these intuition pumps can actually provide information without having to ask the question the old fashion way. I can certainly imagine that consciousness is not something physical. If I don’t think about what I mean by consciousness and just think of it as something abstracted from the experiences and discussions that caused me to have the concept but my ability to imagine something if I Amit relevant information, and don’t think too hard is hardly evidence that it’s actually possible in any relevant sense. I can also imagine 2+2 = 5 if I don’t think too hard about what those numbers mean but it does not mean that it is possible in some sense for the laws of mathematics to be unchanged and yet 2+2 = 5.
More and more, I am beginning to wonder if Scott Alexander is right and there really is something like aphantasia, where some people have a visceral sense that qualia are different and some people don't. To me & Scott, it seems *obvious* that you can get a zombie who still talks about consciousness. (That doesn't mean we're correct, though.)
Note that Chalmers doesn't believe consciousness has no causal role in nature. He does believe consciousness can cause you to talk about it. He just also believes that it would be possible for purely physical forces to cause you to talk about it too. I believe this paper goes into further detail: https://consc.net/papers/nature.pdf but I haven't read Chalmers in as much detail, so I'm giving my best approximation here.
I like this
Okay, now I’m completely confused because aren’t philosophical zombies, supposed to be micro physically identical to us. In what sense can they be micro physically identical if they are not even operating under the same laws of Physics?
Also, even taking this thought experiment on its own terms, isn’t this just another way of asking whether consciousness is identical to something physical? If you think that a heartbeat is the same thing as the physical movement of heart muscles then it’s internally contradictory to imagine somebody who is micro physically identical to you, but doesn’t have a heartbeat. Meanwhile, if you think that a heartbeat isn’t just something physical, it is not contradictory to imagine such a person, so this just seems to be a different way of asking the same question that doesn’t actually bring new light to the issue. Basically, you can’t answer the question of whether a philosophical zombie is self-contradictory without already answering the question of whether consciousness is something physical. In which case there is no point to imagining a philosophical zombie.
I talk about physical possibility because I think that's easier to grasp. Chalmers is talking about metaphysical possibility: he is assuming even the laws of physics *which dictate particle motion and how physical things affect other physical things* are the same, and asking if consciousness can still be modulated.
To your second point: this *is* the same as asking whether consciousness is identical to something physical. But I don't think this makes it pointless: it is meant as a test and intuition pump to *determine* whether consciousness is identical to something physical. It might be easier to think about whether rotating a shape could change its volume rather than whether commutativity of multiplication follows from the Peano axioms. These are deep down the "same question", but one is an easier thinking tool.
Got it about your first point. Regarding your second point, if I am understanding you correctly, you are basically arguing that the idea of a philosophical zombie is still a useful intuition pump. I admit I’m not sure how this works for people who don’t believe in physicalism. However, when I try to imagine this, since when I speak of consciousness, I speak of something which is one of the but for causes of me talking about consciousness. So if you hold the laws of logic and Physics constantremoving consciousness will obviously result in the physical change of me no longer talking about consciousness. Meanwhile, if I believed in eppiphenomenalism I would accordingly imagine that removing consciousness would not have any other effects. Sweet appears that you can’t actually answer the question of whether a philosophical zombie is possible without implicitly, asking the question regarding the nature of consciousness the old-fashioned way without an intuition pump.
Is there something I’m missing? I admit this is not the only consciousness related thought experiment where I have this same problem. Lots of seemingly smart people act like Mary’s room is a brilliant intuition pump, but to me it appear obvious that you can’t actually get anything out of that thought experiment without having to answer the question the old fashion way. My own sense is that people are letting their imagination in the absence of relevant evidence, lead them a stray into thinking these intuition pumps can actually provide information without having to ask the question the old fashion way. I can certainly imagine that consciousness is not something physical. If I don’t think about what I mean by consciousness and just think of it as something abstracted from the experiences and discussions that caused me to have the concept but my ability to imagine something if I Amit relevant information, and don’t think too hard is hardly evidence that it’s actually possible in any relevant sense. I can also imagine 2+2 = 5 if I don’t think too hard about what those numbers mean but it does not mean that it is possible in some sense for the laws of mathematics to be unchanged and yet 2+2 = 5.
More and more, I am beginning to wonder if Scott Alexander is right and there really is something like aphantasia, where some people have a visceral sense that qualia are different and some people don't. To me & Scott, it seems *obvious* that you can get a zombie who still talks about consciousness. (That doesn't mean we're correct, though.)
Note that Chalmers doesn't believe consciousness has no causal role in nature. He does believe consciousness can cause you to talk about it. He just also believes that it would be possible for purely physical forces to cause you to talk about it too. I believe this paper goes into further detail: https://consc.net/papers/nature.pdf but I haven't read Chalmers in as much detail, so I'm giving my best approximation here.